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1Abstract
The ability of a long-lived seller to maintain and proﬁt from a good reputation
may induce her to provide high quality or eﬀort despite short-run incentives to the
contrary. This incentive remains in place with private monitoring, provided that buyers
share their information. However, this assumption is unrealistic in environments where
information sharing is costly or the beneﬁciaries of a buyer’s sharing are strangers. I
study a simple mechanism that induces costly information provision, and may explain
such behavior in environments where the incentives are not overt. Agents who possess
information may share it with the community and acquire a reputation for gossiping.
Reputations function in tandem: sellers provide high eﬀort because they face agents
with reputations for information sharing, and expect the outcome of their dealings will
be made public, while information holders share their information as a reputation for
doing so results in higher eﬀort from sellers.
21 Introduction
The promise of electronic commerce is alluring. Taking advantage of increased interconnec-
tivity and processing power, the Internet enables physically distant buyers and sellers to
ﬁnd each other and transact, permitting otherwise infeasible mutually beneﬁcial pairings.1
The massive increase in potential trading partners brings to the fore an age-old question:
Whom should we trust? Physical distance often makes pre-transaction inspection infeasible,
and payment is often required before delivery. Distance, combined with the relative ease of
building a credible electronic commerce facade, restricts the use of visible clues of a seller’s
trustworthiness.2 Finally, many relationships are one-shot aﬀairs, blunting the threat to
withhold future business.
When interactions between particular buyers and sellers are infrequent, repeat interaction
with a particular market may substitute for repeated interaction with a particular buyer.
The ability of a seller to develop, and proﬁt from, a good reputation may explain trustworthy
behavior such as high post-transaction eﬀort in these environments. Indeed, many on-
line marketplaces have organized reputation mechanisms, the most notable being eBay’s
feedback system. Taking advantage of the same forces that facilitate the on-line search for
a trading partner, a market can collect information about a particular seller, and, at nearly
zero marginal cost, aggregate it in a meaningful way and transmit it to all interested parties.
Thus, in the same way a local merchant’s good standing in the community may serve as a
bond of her trustworthiness, so may a ﬁrm’s on-line reputation.
Previous work has shown that with suﬃcient information, reputations can be quite eﬀective
in inducing cooperative (or trustworthy) behavior when particular agents interact infre-
1For example, eBay reports that 34.7 million users participated in at least one auction in the twelve
months ending September 30, 2003.
2Klein and Leﬄer (1981) highlight the ability of ﬁrm-speciﬁc sunk costs such as advertising to help
consumers decide whom to trust. More generally, Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) present a model in which a
ﬁrm may use advertising to signal high quality. See Bagwell (2001) for a thorough overview of the literature
on advertising and signalling.
3quently. For example, Kandori (1992) looks at games with perfect private monitoring. He
shows that with minimal information requirements, as long as players voluntarily share
their information, any feasible individually rational payoﬀ is robustly supported despite the
lack of repeat interactions between particular agents. In an experimental setting, Bolton
et al. (2004) show that accurate information about the trustworthiness of sellers induces
greater trust and trustworthy behavior than a market in which buyers do not have such
information.3 In their study, providing this information does not generate the same levels
of trust and trustworthy behavior as repeated play with the same partners. In his study
of eBay-like reputation mechanisms in environments in which a buyer’s outcome is an im-
perfect signal of hidden seller actions, Dellarocas (2004) shows maximal eﬃciency can be
attained by providing buyers with a simple statistic of recent seller behavior.
In order for a seller to develop a meaningful reputation, information about the seller’s
dealings must be made public. In this area, electronic commerce faces some unique chal-
lenges. For example, consider the proprietor of a wedding catering business in a community.
While she may not expect too many future transactions with a particular buyer, she still
has incentives to provide high quality services, as she reasonably believes that others in
the community will become aware of her eﬀorts. First, in game theoretic terms, her rela-
tionship with a particular couple has aspects of public monitoring: attendees at the aﬀair
observe a signal of her eﬀort level. This contrasts with the private monitoring that marks
the typical electronic commerce transaction: the actual buyer may be the only recipient
of signals of the seller’s eﬀorts. Second, our local caterer may expect to be the subject of
local gossip. Prospective customers may know and ask the caterer’s previous clients about
their experiences. More subtly, information may be passed along in the normal course of
community interaction, as Mr. Jones raves to his neighbor about how fabulous last night’s
Martinez wedding was. An electronic marketplace can of course take steps to facilitate
information sharing. However, without positive incentives, information is still likely to be
3However, in Bolton et al. (2004), the levels of trust and trustworthy behavior induced by the introduction
of a reputation mechanism were lower than achieved in a treatment with repeated play by the same partners.
4under-provided. By paying the costs associated with providing information, the buyer is
contributing to a public good whose beneﬁciaries are likely to be strangers to him.
Most theoretical work studying reputations assumes that games are either public monitor-
ing,4 or if private monitoring, that all buyers contribute their private information about
sellers to the reputation mechanism, without specifying explicit incentives for them to do
so. There have been a few papers that study mechanisms or institutions that elicit an
agent’s information about trading partners. Avery et al. (1999) consider the case in which
a product’s true quality is unknown. They propose an intuitive payment-based mechanism.
Those who beneﬁt most from the community’s information (i.e., those who try a product
later) compensate those who take the bigger risks (i.e., those who try a product ﬁrst). Klein
(1992) studies the information sharing role of credit bureaus. In his model, a ﬁrm decides
whether or not to join a credit bureau. If it joins, it must provide information about the
creditworthiness of its customers to the bureau.5 In return, the ﬁrm receives information
about the creditworthiness of new customers, which enables it to avoid extending credit to
those who will not repay. Finally, Milgrom et al. (1990) study the role of law merchants in
assuring performance in medieval trade where contracts were unenforceable. In this model,
agents supply information because only by doing so can they expect restitution if they are
cheated. Those who cheat pay restitution to reinstate their good reputation.
I propose a simple mechanism, feasible in many on-line environments, in which agents
voluntarily submit their private information to some central reputation mechanism. Just
as a seller may provide costly eﬀort in order to develop a reputation for doing so, a buyer
may take the costly action of information sharing in order to develop a reputation for doing
so. The reputations function in tandem: a seller provides eﬀort because she faces agents
with reputations for information sharing, and expects the outcomes of her dealings will be
4The ability of an incumbent to develop a reputation for ﬁghting entry in Kreps and Wilson’s 1982 study
of the chain-store paradox is a perfect example of public monitoring.
5In this model, there are no costs to providing information, but rather a cost to join the bureau.
5made public.6 A buyer shares his information because the resulting reputation for doing so
results in more cooperation from sellers.7
In this paper, I make several contributions to the study of games with private monitor-
ing. First, I oﬀer guidance to those charged with the design of reputation mechanisms
in on-line settings. In environments in which altruistically provided information is insuﬃ-
cient and payment-based schemes are infeasible or undesirable, allowing the development of
information-sharing reputations can be quite eﬀective. Second, I help explain the provision
of costly evaluations in environments in which the incentives to do so are not overt. After
all, it would be foolish for a ﬁrm not to provide promised high eﬀort to a known gossip, and
knowing this, a community member might desire to cultivate that reputation.8 Finally, this
paper makes a contribution to the theoretical understanding of repeated games of private
monitoring. I show that information can be structured so that players do provide their pri-
vate information even when it is costly to do so. In games of perfect private monitoring, if
players are suﬃciently patient, the basic mechanism can be modiﬁed such that equilibrium
evaluation costs can be made arbitrarily small. Therefore the set of feasible and individually
rational payoﬀs that are attainable under costly evaluations can be made arbitrarily close
in size to the set attainable were evaluation costs zero. In games in which a buyer’s out-
come does not perfectly reveal the seller’s eﬀort level, however, there is a trade-oﬀ. While
the costs of information sharing are increasing in its frequency, the beneﬁts, in the form of
overall seller eﬀort, are increasing as well.
6I use feminine pronouns for sellers, and masculine for buyers.
7This information structure contrasts with the model studied by Klein (1992). He assumes that ﬁrms do
not develop a reputation for sharing credit information with the credit bureau.
8If I know that the local restaurant is aware of John’s reputation as a truthful gossip, I must take John’s
positive review with a grain of salt. This is why many restaurant reviewers guard their anonymity. Of
course, it would be a very strong signal if John got a poor meal despite his reputation.
62 The Model
Consider an environment in which there are 2N players, indexed n = {1,2,...,2N}. Each
player has a role ρ. N players are buyers (ρ=b), while N players are sellers (ρ=s). I let Nρ
represent the set of role ρ players. In each period, each seller ˆ s is randomly matched with
a buyer denoted by ˆ b = ν(ˆ s,τ) to play a stage game, where ν(n,τ) is some function that
determines each player’s match in each period, τ.9 Each player is matched with exactly 1
other player in each period.
Each stage game consists of two distinct subgames. The ﬁrst is the trading game. If both
players agree to transact, the buyer pays an amount P to the seller, where P is exogenously
determined.10 I let tn represent player n’s decision about whether or not to transact: tn=1
if he agrees to transact, tn =0 if not. If the players agree to transact, the seller provides
either high eﬀort (hˆ s=1) at a cost to her of c > 0, or low eﬀort (hˆ s=0) at a cost normalized
to zero. The eﬀort level selected by the seller aﬀects the outcome experienced by the buyer,
denoted zˆ b. If the seller exerts high eﬀort, the buyer has a good outcome (zˆ b = 1) with
probability λ, and a poor outcome (zˆ b =0) with probability 1−λ. If the seller exerts low
eﬀort, the probabilities of good and poor outcomes are µ and 1−µ respectively. To capture
the fact that buyers value eﬀort, I assume that good outcomes are more likely if the seller
provides high eﬀort (λ>µ). I normalize buyer payoﬀs such that the value to the buyer of
a good outcome is 1, while the value of a poor outcome is 0.
I assume private monitoring. That is, the signal received by a player is visible only to
that player.11 Players may, however, decide to reveal their information in the evaluation
game that directly follows the trading game. In the evaluation game, player n may provide
an evaluation to the community (en = 1) at a cost of k > 0. Alternatively, if he decides
9Throughout the paper, I let ˆ s refer to an arbitrary seller and ˆ b to an arbitrary buyer.
10I assume that contracts that specify outcome-based payments are unenforceable.
11Of course, if an action always produces a particular outcome (λ=1 or µ=0), then the seller knows the
buyer’s outcome if she selects that action.
7not to provide an evaluation (en = 0), he avoids this cost. It is most natural to think of
buyers evaluating sellers. However, I consider cases in which an equilibrium strategy calls
for certain buyers to allow themselves to be punished. In such cases, a community may
need the seller to make public the buyer’s actions.
I represent the stage game actions of seller ˆ s with aˆ s = {tˆ s,hˆ s,eˆ s}, buyer ˆ b’s with aˆ b =
{tˆ b,eˆ b}, the actions of both matched players with a = {aˆ s,aˆ b}, and the set of possible
actions with A. Player n’s mixed action is denoted by αn. I deﬁne BR(αn) as player
ν(n,τ)’s stage-game best response to αn.
Expected trading game payoﬀs for a pair, fn(a),n = ˆ b, ˆ s, are:
fˆ s(a) = tˆ btˆ s(P − hˆ sc);
fˆ b(a) = tˆ btˆ s (−P + hˆ sλ + (1−hˆ s)µ).
Expected payoﬀs for the entire stage game (trading and evaluation games), gn(a),n = b,s,
are:
gˆ s(a) = tˆ btˆ s(P − hˆ sc) − eˆ sk; (1)
gˆ b(a) = tˆ btˆ s (−P + hˆ sλ + (1−hˆ s)µ) − eˆ bk. (2)
A player can guarantee himself a stage-game payoﬀ of 0 by neither transacting nor evalu-
ating. Let gn(am) = 0 represent player n’s minimax payoﬀs. I consider two sets of payoﬀs
that are feasible and individually rational in the sense that they are at least as large as the
minimax payoﬀs. The ﬁrst set is feasible and individually rational trading game payoﬀs:
V = {v ∈ co f(A)|v  0} where co f(A) is the convex hull of the set f(A). I represent
the action proﬁle that achieves a particular v∗ ∈ V with a∗. In order to achieve payoﬀs
8v in the interior of this set, players may need to play a correlated strategy.12 I assume
a correlation device is available to the players. Second, I deﬁne the set of feasible and
individually rational stage-game payoﬀs, which includes both the trading and the evalu-
ation games. Note that if a correlated strategy proﬁle calls for the buyer to not provide
an evaluation, he then knows that the seller will not provide eﬀort, and will therefore not
trade at a price above µ. Therefore, the set of feasible and individually rational stage game
payoﬀs is V † = {v ∈ co g(a)|v  0,an ∈ BR(a−n) if eˆ b = 0 for n = {b,s}} where co g(A)
is the convex hull of the set g(A). The two sets coincide under the assumption of costless
evaluation provision, as fn(a) = gn(a). In this study, I compare the two sets under costly
evaluations.
The stage game, including the random matching and both subgames, is repeated inﬁnitely.





where δ ∈ (0,1) is the common discount factor.
I make the following assumptions about the provision of evaluations.
Assumption 1. The individual direct costs or beneﬁts associated with providing an evalu-
ation are independent of the content of the evaluation.
Assumption 2. If a player provides an evaluation, he does so truthfully.
Assumption 1 states that the content of an evaluation in no way aﬀects the incentives to
provide an evaluation. One can imagine plausible scenarios in which this might not hold.
For example, one might receive a psychic beneﬁt for providing either a positive or negative
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9evaluation. Providing a negative evaluation after a bad experience might be particularly
satisfying. In other cases, however, particularly in cases in which the distinction between
positive and negative outcomes is more ambiguous, a buyer might be hesitant to leave a
negative evaluation, heeding his mother’s advice about not saying anything unless he has
something good to say. In the mechanisms I detail below, future sellers know only whether
or not a buyer provides evaluations, and not the content of these evaluations. Buyers
therefore have no incentive to report dishonestly, and Assumption 2 states that if a buyer
is indeed indiﬀerent, he reports honestly.13
A community will have some convention for turning information available about an agent
into her reputation. For example, eBay gives each participant a feedback score which is the
summation of 1 for every user who leaves a positive review and -1 for every negative.14 In
order to study the eﬀects of reputations on equilibrium payoﬀs and evaluation provision,
I adapt the simple yet powerful reputation framework ﬁrst introduced by Okuno-Fujiwara
and Postlewaite (1995) and further studied by Kandori (1992).15
Deﬁnition 1. A matching game with extended local information processing has the
following information structure.
1. An updating phase xn∈{1,2,...,Tρ} is permanently assigned to each player n ∈ Nρ,
ρ = b,s.
2. A reputation rn(τ) ∈ Rρ is assigned to each n ∈ Nρ, ρ = b,s, at time τ.
3. When player ˆ s and ˆ b meet at time τ and take actions (aˆ s(τ),aˆ b(τ)), their next states
13Miller et al. (2005) present a mechanism for eliciting honest feedback in environments in which the
evaluated object’s type is unknown, i.e., environments of adverse selection.
14In addition, eBay also presents a summary table of feedbacks in the previous 6 months, as well as a
listing of every feedback, including comments.
15Kandori (1992) cites an earlier working paper version of the Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995)
paper.
10Player actions in bold
Each seller randomly matched with a buyer.
If players transact, seller
privately selects effort level.
If players transact, buyer privately
observes result of seller effort.
Players decide whether to report
transaction details to reputation mechanism.  
Reputations revealed within each match.
Players decide whether or not to transact.
Reputations updated.
Event
Figure 1: Timing of the stage game.
are determined by




rn(τ) if (τ + xn) mod Tρ 6= 0
φρ(·) if (τ + xn) mod Tρ = 0,
where
φρ(·) = φρ(rn(τ),an(τ−Tρ+1),...,an(τ),aν(n,t−Tρ+1)(τ−Tρ+1),...,aν(n,τ)(τ))
4. At time τ, player n can observe at least (rn(τ),rν(n,τ)(τ)), but not xν(n,τ), before
choosing her action.
A feature of extended local information processing is that players may keep the same repu-
tation over many periods. His next reputation is then based on his and his partners’ actions
over these periods. This contrasts with Kandori (1992), who assumed that each player’s
11reputation cycle lasts one period (Tρ=1). Second, I endogenize the choice of evaluating, but
do assume that evaluations are truthful if provided. This means that the mechanism must
be able to assign reputations when, for example, a buyer does not provide an evaluation of
the seller. I present an outline of the stage game in Figure 1.
In deciding upon a strategy, a player may, in certain environments, have at his disposal
information in addition to the reputation of his trading partner. I consider equilibria that
are robust to details of information structure. In particular, I look at straightforward equi-
libria, as introduced by Kandori (1992). In a straightforward equilibrium, player actions
are determined solely by the labels associated with each player in the pair, which in this
setting will be their reputations. Strategies, a function of reputations, are thus given by the
following functions:
αn(t) = σρ(rn(t),rν(n,t)(t)) for n ∈ Nρ,ρ = b,s.
It is also desirable that an equilibrium be robust. Players, particularly newcomers to a
market or community, might make mistakes. An equilibrium achieving payoﬀs v is globally
stable if for any ﬁnite history of actions {a},
lim
τ→∞E(vn(τ)|{a}) = vρ ∀n ∈ Nρ,ρ = b,s.
If an equilibrium is globally stable, then for any “initial” distribution of reputations, pay-
oﬀs converge to v for all players when players play equilibrium strategies from that point
on. This requirement rules out, for example, equilibria that are supported by punishing
deviators for an inﬁnite number of period.
Finally, in certain cases, I shall consider diﬀerent player types. With probability γ, a buyer is
an altruist. I assume that an altruist always provides an evaluation. All others, both buyers
and sellers, are risk-neutral strategic players whose objective is to maximize the average
12discounted value of per-period payoﬀs. Consistent with the adverse-selection literature, a
player’s type is only observable to himself.
3 Games with Perfect Private Monitoring
In games with perfect monitoring, the signal that each player receives perfectly informs
him about the action of the other player. This means that high eﬀort always produces a
good outcome (λ = 1), while low eﬀort always produces a poor outcome (µ = 0).16 While
the buyer knows with certainty which eﬀort level the seller selected based on his outcome,
the private monitoring assumption means that only the matched buyer and seller know the
outcome.
As a benchmark, I start by considering outcomes possible if all buyers provide costless
evaluations. This is the case considered by Kandori (1992). As demonstrated by the next
proposition, he shows that all individually rational payoﬀs are possible.
Proposition 1 (Kandori (1992)). Under the assumption of costless truthful evaluation
provision, every point v∗∈V is sustained by a straightforward and globally stable equilibrium
with extended local information processing if δ∈(δ∗,1) for some δ∗.
Proof. By individual rationality, it must be the case that P ∈[c,1] for v  0. Sellers would
never provide eﬀort if the price were lower, buyers would never agree to transact were it
higher. As evaluation costs are assumed to be zero, for all P ∈[c,1], if buyers believe that
sellers will provide high eﬀort, buyers agree to transact. I now show that sellers will provide
high eﬀort.
16Perfect monitoring has the same eﬀect as observable actions.





a∗ if rˆ s = 0
am if rˆ s 6= 0,
where am is any strategy in which the buyer does not transact and thus gives the seller her
minimax payoﬀ. Set each buyer’s reputation equal to 0, and let each seller’s reputation be
determined by the following:
φs(r,a) =

    
    
0 if rˆ s=0 and aˆ s = a∗
1 if aˆ s 6= σs(r)
(rˆ s + 1) mod (X + 1) if rˆ s 6= 1 and aˆ s = σs(r)
For a given δ suﬃciently large, set X < ∞ such that the maximal gains from deviating,
namely not incurring eﬀort cost c, are oﬀset by X periods of zero payoﬀs. As v is positive
by individual rationality, such an X < ∞ exists for δ suﬃciently large. As X < ∞, after
X periods, all players receive v∗ regardless of starting history, therefore the equilibrium is
globally stable. 
Proposition 1 highlights the ability of local information processing to sustain high levels of
“cooperative” eﬀort. In equilibrium, if a seller cheats, she gets a bad reputation. Buyers
punish her by holding her to her minimax payoﬀ for the next X periods. As long as she
cares enough about these future periods, this punishment is severe enough to outweigh the
gains from not providing high eﬀort, c. Thus, even without repeated interactions between
particular agents, and with very little information transmitted between them, folk theorem-
like results hold: any individually rational payoﬀ possible in the stage game can be an
equilibrium outcome of the inﬁnitely repeated game if players are suﬃciently patient.17
The next proposition conﬁrms the intuition that, in games of private monitoring with costly
17Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) show this is the case when the same agents play the inﬁnitely repeated
game.
14information sharing, strategic buyers need to be given some incentives in order to provide
the information necessary for high eﬀort equilibria.
Proposition 2. If all buyers are strategic buyers and φ({a∗
s,t∗
ˆ b,eˆ b=1},r,τ) = φ({a∗
s,t∗
ˆ b,eˆ b=
0},r,τ) for σ(r) = a∗ and all τ, then the only straightforward equilibrium is the stage-game
Nash equilibrium of no seller high eﬀort.
Proof. Assume not. Let a∗ be the action proﬁle that achieves v∗ ∈ V † and r∗ a reputation
pair in which this strategy is played.
First, if a buyer is required to provide an evaluation in r∗ he can proﬁtably deviate by not
providing an evaluation. He earns k by not providing an evaluation. His future payoﬀs
are not aﬀected as, by assumption, both his and his seller’s reputation is independent of
whether or not he provides an evaluation. Therefore, buyers will not provide evaluations.
Under no evaluation provision, a seller’s reputation next period is independent of whether
she provides eﬀort this period. As strategies are based only on reputations, a seller’s best
response is to provide no eﬀort. As this is true for an arbitrary state, it is true for all. 
Proposition 2 says that if reputations cannot signal the fact that a player did not provide
an evaluation, then, if all buyers are strategic, the only equilibrium is one in which sellers
either provide no eﬀort or do not transact. It highlights two forces at work. The ﬁrst is
the classic free-rider problem. If reputations do not track whether or not evaluations are
provided, buyers have no incentives to provide them. Second, a community must share
some information in order to achieve cooperative outcomes.
Before considering the ability of buyers to develop a reputation for information sharing, I
consider alternative motivations for sharing information. In certain communities, there may
be unmodelled beneﬁts to providing information to the community. If certain buyers care
about the well-being of fellow community members, they may desire to provide costly eval-
15uations. The existence of altruistic behavior has been well documented in the experimental
literature.18 In an environment similar to this model without reputations for information
sharing, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) report that buyers rate sellers in approximately
50% of all eBay transactions, a ﬁnding consistent with altruistic behavior.
With this in mind, I assume that with probability equal to γ∈(0,1], a buyer is a commitment
type who always provides evaluations (an altruist).19 The remaining buyers are strategic
types whose payoﬀs are as previously speciﬁed. A player’s type is hidden from his match.
As the next result shows, the folk theorem still holds even when strategic buyers do not
provide evaluations.
Proposition 3. If there are buyers who always provide evaluations, there exists a straight-
forward and globally stable equilibrium under extended local information processing for all
v∗∈V if δ∈(δ∗,1) for some δ∗.
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume for altruistic buyers who always leave evaluations, k = 0.20
Let {a∗,P} be such that strategic buyers never provide evaluations (eb = 0) and v = v∗.




    
    
0 if rˆ s=0 and (aˆ s = a∗ if eˆ b = 1)
1 if aˆ s 6= σb(r) and eˆ b = 1
(rˆ s + 1) mod (X + 1) if rˆ s 6= 0 and not (aˆ s 6= σb(r) and eˆ b = 1).
Note that seller punishment only (re)starts if, when she deviates, she happens to be faced
with an altruistic evaluator. The remainder of the proof follows the proof of Proposition
18See, for example, Eckel and Grossman (1996), Palfrey and Prisbey (1996) and Andreoni and Miller
(2002).
19Under the assumption that the provision of evaluations does not aﬀect buyer reputations, it does not
matter whether γ refers to the percentage of players who always play altruistically or whether all buyers play
“altruistically” with probability γ. The important assumption is that sellers believe that the probability of
an evaluation following any particular transaction equals γ.
20If evaluations costs were negative for altruists, total payoﬀs would actually be greater than compared
with the base case.
161. 
Provided that at least some evaluations are provided altruistically, then the eﬃcient outcome
of always providing eﬀort is an equilibrium outcome if players are suﬃciently patient. The
degree of patience required will depend on the proportion of altruistic evaluators. The
fewer altruists, the more likely that a seller can get away with low eﬀort without getting
caught. This increase in the expected beneﬁts of deviating from a cooperative equilibrium
must be matched with an increase in the punishment conditional on getting caught. As the
punishment takes the form of periods of holding the caught deviator to her minimax payoﬀ,
an increase in punishment takes the form of extending the punishment period. This threat
has deterrence power only insofar as the seller suﬃciently cares about these periods far in
the future. The next result demonstrates this link between the percent of altruistic buyers





γP + (1 − γ)c,
(3)
then there exists a straightforward and globally stable equilibrium under extended local in-
formation processing in which sellers always provide high eﬀort.
Proof. Proposed action proﬁles are as = {1,1,0} for sellers, ab = {1,0} for strategic buyers
and ab = {1,1} for commitment buyers. Let this proﬁle be a∗. If sellers always provide
eﬀort, then by Equation (2), the best response for is for buyers to transact.
The following speciﬁcation gives sellers the greatest incentive to provide high eﬀort. Namely,





a∗ if rˆ s = 0
m if rˆ s = 1.





0 if rˆ s = 0 and (as = σs(r) if eˆ b=1)
1 otherwise.
As buyers are always playing a best response, I only need to check the incentive constraints
for sellers. Values to following the strategy and a deviation are given as below:
v(aˆ s=1) = (1 − δ)(P − c) + δ(P − c)
v(aˆ s=0) = (1 − δ)(P) + γδ0 + (1 − γ)δ(p − c)
Thus, players do not deviate from the equilibrium as long as δ > c
Pγ+(1−γ)c,. 
This result highlights the need for rents from investing in a reputation. Looking at the case
in which all players are altruists who provide evaluations (γ =1), we see that in order for
sellers to provide high eﬀort, it must be the case that δ < c
P . Thus, as the seller gets more
of the surplus created by her eﬀort, i.e., a larger P, less patience is required to support
the eﬃcient outcome. This result has been noted in Klein and Leﬄer (1981) and Shapiro
(1983).
Altruists perform a public service. Given the fact that a seller has no way of knowing
the buyer’s type, she is not able to diﬀerentiate eﬀort levels between them. Assuming
that buyers are suﬃciently patient, the possibility that a current match might provide his
information to the community is suﬃcient to induce the seller to act in a trustworthy
manner. Of course, the fewer altruists, the more tempting it is for a seller to defect from
the high-eﬀort equilibrium because it is less likely that she will get caught. It is thus not
surprising that environments that depend on the voluntary provision of private information,
such as eBay, encourage its provision.21 From the Web site of eBay Inc. (2004):
21eBay has also started to provide traders with information concerning a member’s history in leaving
feedback. I discuss eBay’s new system in relation to the mechanism I propose in Section 5.
18“Leave feedback after completing any purchase or sale on eBay. Your honest
feedback shapes the eBay community and impacts the success and behavior of
other eBay members.”
Notwithstanding eBay’s commercial success, suﬃcient altruism may be diﬃcult to foster in
on-line environments similar to eBay. Due to the sheer number of buyers, the probability
that a particular provision of information will be of beneﬁt to those a particular buyer
knows, much less cares about, will be low. Hoﬀman et al. (1996) ﬁnd that social distance
between “giver” and “recipient” or observer may be an important determinant of altruistic
behavior.
When buyers are not suﬃciently patient relative to the number of altruistic evaluators, other
mechanisms provide incentives for private information provision. I consider a community
or market that tracks whether or not an information holder provides his information to the
community, and thus allows him to develop a reputation for information provision. It also
allows sellers to distinguish between those who do and those who do not provide evaluations,
and potentially treat them diﬀerently.
Both the buyer and the seller have an incentive problem. Just as the seller has a myopic
incentive not to provide high eﬀort after payment has been received, the buyer has a myopic
incentive not to provide an evaluation after the good or service has been received. This
creates an additional problem, as illustrated by the following mental exercise. Imagine
a community that has been playing a two-sided reputation game for an arbitrarily large
number of periods, with each player using an arbitrary strategy. After period N, a central
planner gathers all the community members together in a room and proposes that starting
with period N +1, everyone play a speciﬁed “equilibrium” strategy. The players, each of
whom has had a diﬀerent history of play and thus diﬀerent beliefs about the distribution
of reputations, go home and contemplate this strategy. The speciﬁed strategy is only an
equilibrium if every player, regardless of history, and believing everyone else will play the
19strategy, desires to play the strategy at N + 1. Consider, however a player with a good
reputation who believes that he will encounter many players with bad reputations in the
future.22 If punishment is costly to the player with a good reputation, the belief that he
will need to punish many in the future may induce him to “defect” now. The future with
a positive reputation is not very valuable to him, and he might well desire to not invest in
a positive reputation today. I therefore deﬁne the following repent action ag
ρ for each role.
Deﬁnition 2. A buyer’s repent action is ag
b ={tb=1,eb=0} while the seller plays am∗
s =
{ts=1,hs=0,es=1} for some P > k. A seller’s repent action is ag
s ={ts=1,hs=1,es=0}
while the buyer plays am∗
b ={tb=1,eb=1} for P = 0.
The repent action for an agent is one that, when her partner is playing a minimax strategy in
the trading game, increases the partner’s payoﬀs while not increasing the repenting agent’s
payoﬀs. In this game, the seller repents by providing high quality even though the buyer
pays nothing. The buyer repents by paying P > k with the knowledge that the seller
with whom he is matched will not provide high eﬀort.23 In either event, the “payment”
needs to be at least k so that the partner can provide the information to the community
that the match did, indeed, repent, while at the same time receiving a payoﬀ better than
the minimax value. If the buyer deviates from a cooperative equilibrium when he has a
good reputation, the signal will be the lack of an evaluation. However, when a buyer is
“repenting,” it needs to be the seller who provides the information to the community about
whether or not he repented.
The equilibrium strategies have the following ﬂavor. When two players with a positive
reputation are matched, they play a∗ achieving v∗ ∈ V †. When two players with poor
reputations are matched, they play the mutual minimax strategies. When a player with a
22A player with a good or positive reputation is one who does not need to be “punished.” In this context,
a seller with a good reputation is one who provides high eﬀort, while a buyer with a good reputation is one
who provides evaluations.
23If the buyer does provide an evaluation, it does not aﬀect the seller’s reputation as the community knows
that she is supposed to punish the buyer.
20poor reputation is matched with a player with a positive reputation, the latter minimaxes
the former, while the player with a poor reputation plays the repent action. The next
result demonstrates the range of payoﬀs available under local information processing when
evaluation provision is costly and reputations are updated every period.
Proposition 5. If reputations are updated every period (Tρ = 1, ρ = b,s), every point
v ∈ V † is sustained by a straightforward and globally stable equilibrium with local information
processing, if δ ∈ (δ∗,1) for some δ∗.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proposition follows from Kandori (1992, Theorem 2), the mod-
iﬁed proof of which I present here.
Let Tb=Ts=1. Let a∗ be the action proﬁle, possibly in correlated strategies that achieves
payoﬀs v∗. Strategies are given by:
σ(r) =

       
       
a∗ if r = (0,0)
(am
s ,ag
b ) if rˆ s = 0 and rˆ b 6= 0
(ag
s ,am
b ) if rˆ s 6= 0 and rˆ b = 0
am if rˆ s,rˆ b 6= 0.
(4)
Reputations for sellers are given by
φs(r,a) =

    
    
0 if rˆ s = 0 and aˆ s = σs(r)
1 if aˆ s 6= σs(r)
(rˆ s+1) mod (X+1) if rˆ s 6= 0 and aˆ s = σs(r),
where X is the number of punishment periods. Buyer reputations are determined analo-
gously.
I ﬁrst check that there is some (δ∗ < 1,X < ∞) such that a seller in the punishment phase
21follows the proposed strategies. If she complies she gets
x(1) + δx(2) + ··· + δX−1x(t) + (δX + δX+1 + ···)vs (5)
where x(τ) is either g(am) = 0 or gs(ag
s ,am∗
b ) ≤ 0, depending on her match in period τ. If
she defects from her punishment, the best she can do is
0 + δx(2) + ··· + δX−1x(τ) + δXgs(ag
s ,am∗
b ) + (δX+1 + δX+2 + ···)vs. (6)
If she deviates, she will deﬁnitely meet a buyer with a positive reputation in period (X+1),
as all other players have followed equilibrium strategies. Subtracting equation (6) from (5)
reduces to x(1) − δXgs(ag
s ,am∗
b ) + δXvs, which will be positive for δX close to one.24
I now check the incentives of a seller with a positive reputation to comply with the strategy.












where the left-hand side is the minimum value of complying with σ, the right-hand side the
best outcome if she deviates, and ˆ vs is the seller’s most proﬁtable deviation. Increasing δ
while holding δX constant, the right-hand side of equation (7) approaches (1−δX)gs(am)+
δXvs, which is strictly less than the left-hand side.
The incentive constraints for the buyer are analogous. As all players have a positive repu-
tation after at most X periods, the equilibrium is globally stable. 
Proposition 5 shows that without the altruistic provision of evaluations, all individually
rational stage game payoﬀs can be sustained in equilibrium. I now investigate what must
be true in order to get players to provide their private information to the community. The





b ) + δ
Xvs.
22value to buyers of an equilibrium in which they provide evaluations and sellers provide high
eﬀort is given by (1−P −k). The harshest punishment is one in which sellers never trade
with a buyer with a bad reputation for information sharing. The value of deviating is at





Just as suﬃcient rents available to the seller are necessary in order for her to invest in
a reputation for providing high eﬀort, suﬃcient rents available to the information holder
(1−p) are also necessary in order for him to invest in a reputation for information sharing.
Combining Equation (3) given that all buyers provide evaluations (γ=1) with Equation (8)
shows that if
δ > c + k,
then there exists a P such that the eﬃcient outcome is obtainable under local information
processing in a community that tracks information sharing reputations.
That the set of equilibrium payoﬀs is smaller when evaluations are costly is not surprising:
someone needs to fund these costs out of trading-game proﬁts. When buyer reputations are
updated each period, as assumed, these costs need to be paid each period in which there
is eﬀort by the seller. However, as shown in Proposition 4 in the context of altruistically
provided evaluations, evaluation provision in each period may not be necessary to provide
incentives for high eﬀort. If a seller believes that her probability of being caught is large
enough relative to her discount factor, she will not chance punishment.
Taken together, these observations imply that communities may be able to reclaim much of
the lost surplus by requiring that buyers provide an evaluation in some fraction of periods in
order to maintain a reputation for information sharing. Consider a community that assigns
a positive reputation for information sharing as long as a buyer provides an evaluation once
23every “cycle” of 7 periods. Due to discounting, if the buyer desires to maintain a positive
reputation, he will wait until the ﬁnal period of each cycle to provide an evaluation. That
is, if his cycle ends on Tuesday, he will wait until Tuesday to provide an evaluation. Assume
that on each day of the week, one out of every seven buyers starts a new cycle. As long as
the seller does not know on which day of the week a particular buyer’s cycle ends, she faces
the same problem as she does when 1
7 of all buyers are altruists.25
I now present the main result of this section. Under perfect private monitoring, even
if evaluations are costly, all payoﬀs in the interior of the set of feasible and individually
rational payoﬀs can be supported as long as the discount factor is high enough. In these
equilibria, if a buyer has a positive reputation, his reputation is updated once every Tb
periods. If he provided an evaluation at least once in the last Tb periods, he maintains a
positive reputation. If not, he enters an X-period punishment phase: he plays the repent
action if he meets a seller with a positive reputation, and minimaxes a seller with a negative
reputation. Each seller’s reputation cycle is one period long (Ts = 1): any time she is
“caught” deviating, she enters the punishment phase.
First, I formally deﬁne V ‡, the set of all feasible and individually rational payoﬀs except
for the outer boundary of feasible trading game payoﬀs.
Deﬁnition 3. V ‡ = {v ∈ co f(A)|v  0,vb+vs < 1−c} where co f(A) is the convex hull
of the set f(A).
Theorem 1. Let V (δ,N) be the set of equilibrium payoﬀs when the discount factor is δ and
there are N players of each type. Under extended local information processing,
lim
δ→1,N→∞
V (δ,N) = V ‡.
25I thank Paul Resnick for pointing out an alternative version of the mechanism, which may be more
feasible in an online environment. Rather than requiring the buyer to provide an evaluation once every 7
periods, this mechanism would, with probability
1
7 after any transaction, inform the buyer that he needs
to provide an evaluation this period in order to maintain a positive reputation. The outcomes of either
mechanism are qualitatively similar.
24Proof. By Proposition 5, every v ∈ V † is sustained by a straightforward and globally stable
equilibrium under extended local information processing. Select any v∗ ∈ V ‡ \ V †. Letting
Pr[eb=1] = 1







with Pr[hstbts=1|a∗] ≤ 1. Given a total value of v∗
b + v∗
s, select P such that buyer receives
v∗
b and seller receives v∗
s.
Let a seller’s reputation be updated every period, and a buyer’s every Tb periods. Assign
each buyer and updating phase xˆ b ∈ {1,2,...,Tb} such that there exists at least one buyer
with xˆ b=x0 for all x0 ∈ {1,2,...,Tb}. This requires that N ≥ Tb. Therefore, for all τ, there
is at least 1 buyer such that (τ + xˆ b) mod Tb=0.
Strategies are as speciﬁed in equation (4). Seller reputations are given by
φs(r,a) =

    
    
0 if rˆ s = 0 and (aˆ s=σs(r) if aˆ b=1)
1 if (aˆ s 6= σs(r) if aˆ b=1)
(rˆ s+1) mod (T+1) if rˆ s 6= 0 and (aˆ s=σs(r) if aˆ b=1).
Buyer reputations are given by:
φb(r,a,τ) =

       
       
0 if rˆ b = 0 and (if (t + xˆ b) mod N∗=0,aˆ b=σb(r))
1 if (aˆ b6=σb(r) if rˆ b6=0) or (if rˆ b=0,(t + xˆ b) mod N∗=0
and aˆ b 6= σb(r))
(rˆ b+1) mod (T+1) if rˆ b 6= 0 and aˆ b=σb(r).
Note ﬁrst that in the punishment phase, there are always evaluations, so satisfaction of the
incentive constraint follows from the proof of Proposition 5.
Note that the incentive constraint of a buyer with a positive reputation is unchanged as
25well. The incentive constraint of a seller with a positive reputation is more subtle. This is
due to the fact that if she defects, she might not get caught. At the time of deciding whether
or not to deviate, the reputations of her future partners are independent of whether or not
she gets caught. Deﬁne ζ(τ) as a buyer’s assessment of the probability of being partnered
with a buyer with a poor reputation at time τ. Further deﬁne ΥX
τ =
PX
t=1 δt−1(ζ(t + τ) ·
gs(am∗
s ,ag
b )+(1−ζ(t+τ))·vs), the expected discounted payoﬀs over X periods conditional
on having a positive reputation, starting τ periods in the future.
The seller’s constraint becomes
(1−δX)ΥX






Holding δT constant, as δ increases, the right-hand side approaches (1−δT)(γgs(m)+(1−
γ)ΥT
1 )+δTvs, which is strictly less than the right-hand size as gs(m) is less than either
gs(am
s ,ag
b ) or vs .
As the punishment phase ends in X periods, the equilibrium is globally stable. 
Remark: To appreciate the need for a suﬃcient number of players (N ≥ N∗) consider
the following. Assume there are 10 buyers, and a community decides that maintaining a
positive reputation requires one evaluation every 100 periods. A seller knows that no buyer
is providing an evaluation in at least 90 out of every 100 periods. She may decide not to
provide high eﬀort for if she is caught, she has learned information about the period of the
cycle in which detection is more likely. If there is a positive probability of getting caught
in each period (i.e., there are at least as many players as there are periods in a cycle), then
by Proposition 3, there is threshold δ∗ such that if the discount rate is above δ∗, the seller
does not deviate even if she knows which period has the lowest (non-zero) probability of
being detected. If there are players who provide evaluations altruistically in each period,
then there is no longer a need for a suﬃcient number of buyers.
26Theorem 1 shows that as players become increasingly patient, a community can require less
frequent evaluations—they can increase the buyer’s reputation cycle Tb. Total evaluation
costs, even for a large cost of providing evaluations, tend toward 0 as Tb increases, and
therefore, in the limit, the set of payoﬀs available to the community are arbitrarily close
to those available if evaluations were costless. This result is similar in spirit to the main
result presented by Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003). In both their work and this study,
evaluations are provided only periodically. They, however, consider games of private mon-
itoring played repeatedly by the same group of players. Their mechanism induces truthful
announcements, but relies on a more complicated mechanism with additional information
assumptions that require both the evaluator and the evaluatee to announce the evaluatee’s
action.
4 Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
In games with imperfect monitoring, the signal a player receives does not perfectly inform
him about the actions of other players in the game. In the trading game, this means that
either outcome is possible regardless of seller eﬀort level. While a good outcome for the
buyer is more likely if the seller exerts high eﬀort, it is also possible that the seller exerted
low eﬀort.26 As a result, even if all outcomes are publicly revealed, a seller always providing
high eﬀort cannot be an equilibrium.
The trading game is a moral hazard mixing game. Fudenberg and Levine (1994) show that
in these games, maximal long-run payoﬀs are strictly less than those possible if actions
rather than outcomes were observable. This result holds even if all outcomes are publicly
observable. Bad outcomes are inevitable, and buyers must punish bad outcomes in order
26Weakening the assumption that evaluations are truthful (Assumption 2) in games of perfect monitoring
yields a game analogous to the game with imperfect monitoring. In either case, there is a positive probability
that a seller exerts high eﬀort but the evaluation is negative.
27to provide incentives for the seller to exert eﬀort. The seller strategy “always provide high
eﬀort” is not credible because if the buyers believed it, the seller would not provide high
eﬀort and blame the fates for poor outcomes.
Thus, games of imperfect monitoring have the feature of putting punishments on the equi-
librium path. This contrasts with the game under the assumption of perfect monitoring:
punishment is oﬀ the equilibrium path, and therefore increasing the severity of the punish-
ment does not alter the equilibrium “value” of the game. When punishments are on the
equilibrium path, the severity of any punishments aﬀect equilibrium payoﬀs and eﬃciency.
In this section, I study the relationship between the amount of information elicited (i.e.,
the evaluation frequency) and required seller punishment, and thus overall eﬃciency.
As “moral hazard mixing game” suggests, players must randomize in order to maintain
incentives for the seller to provide high eﬀort with positive probability. Consider the trading
game in which all outcomes are public. The seller’s proﬁts must be higher after a good
outcome than after a bad outcome, otherwise she would never desire to provide costly high
eﬀort.
Assume ﬁrst that prices are ﬁxed. In order for expected proﬁts to be greater with a better
reputation, the probability of a transaction must be higher when the seller has a good rep-
utation. Buyers can accomplish this by agreeing to transact with a higher probability when
a seller has a good reputation. A buyer must therefore be indiﬀerent between transacting
and not. To make buyers indiﬀerent, sellers must select the probability of high eﬀort that
leaves the buyer indiﬀerent to transacting given the price. This has two implications. First,
the probability of high eﬀort is independent of the seller’s reputation. A reputation is not
an indicator of outcomes, but rather a coordination device that indicates to the indiﬀerent
buyer the probability with which he ought to transact. Second, transactions do not occur
in all periods, complicating the reputation updating process.
28If prices change according to the reputations of the agents in a pair, the pricing mechanism
may work to increase good-reputation proﬁts. I therefore assume that the price a buyer
pays, if both parties agree to transact is equal to a ﬁxed proportion, p, of the expected value
of the item to the buyer.
Assumption 3. The price in the trading game is P = p·˜ zˆ sˆ b, where ˜ zˆ sˆ b = µ+Prob[hb =
1|rˆ s,rˆ b](λ−µ) (i.e., the expected outcome given strategies induced by given seller and buyer
reputations) and p∈[0,1] is exogenously determined.
This assumption leads to a couple of desirable characteristics in the equilibria described
below. First, transactions rationally occur within each match, simplifying reputation tran-
sitions and allowing focus on the incentives to develop reputations. Second, reputations will
be meaningful in the sense that a better reputation will be associated with an increased
probability of high eﬀort.
As a ﬁrst step, I compare achievable outcomes under imperfect public monitoring with those
available under perfect monitoring. I then derive the conditions under which, if we assume
evaluations are provided with a speciﬁed probability, extended local information processing
delivers these outcomes in games of imperfect private monitoring. Finally, I return to the
question of buyer incentives, and derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for buyers to
provide evaluations in equilibrium under extended local information processing. The next
lemma speciﬁes maximal seller payoﬀs under public monitoring.


















Proof. I use the maximal score method presented by Fudenberg and Levine (1994) in order
to determine the greatest perfect public equilibrium payoﬀs available to the seller in the
29trading game under the assumption of perfect public monitoring. First note that the game
has a product structure. That is, the probability distribution of the signals that seller ˆ s
sends to her buyer (i.e., buyer ν(ˆ s,τ)’s outcome) is independent of the actions of other
sellers. Denote public signals by z1=(zˆ b=1) and z0=(zˆ b=0), and the outcome probability
matrix Πˆ s(αˆ b) where rows correspond to each strategy aˆ b and columns to zˆ b, where an entry
corresponds to Pr[zˆ b|aˆ s]. A game with a product structure has suﬃcient rank at α if every
left null vector of Πˆ s(αˆ b) is orthogonal to the vector fˆ s(α−i). For αˆ b ∈ BR(αs), the outcome
probability matrix is









0 λ 1 − λ








where the columns correspond to no trade, positive outcomes and negative outcomes re-
spectively. The ﬁrst two rows correspond the case in which the seller does not transact.
As λ 6= µ by assumption, the left null vector of Πˆ s(αˆ b) at αˆ b ∈ BR(αs) is 0, and is thus
orthogonal to the vector fˆ s(α−i).
Given satisfaction of the full-rank condition Fudenberg and Levine (1994, Theorem 5.2)




vˆ s subject to
vˆ s = (1−δ)fs(aˆ s,αˆ b) + δ (Pr[z1|aˆ s]wˆ s(z1) + (1 − Pr[z1|aˆ s])wˆ s(z0))
for aˆ s such that α(aˆ s) > 0
vˆ s ≥ (1−δ)fs(aˆ s,αˆ b) + δ (Pr[z1|aˆ s]wˆ s(z1) + (1 − Pr[z1|aˆ s])wˆ s(z0))
for aˆ s such that α(aˆ s) = 0





c, the solution to the linear programming problem is:
vˆ s = p ∗ µ
hs = 0





c, the solution to the linear programming problem is:




w(z1) = vˆ s





A seller will desire to provide high eﬀort when its value is suﬃciently large. Lemma 1
identiﬁes the two major determinants of the value of high eﬀort. First, the value of high
eﬀort, and thus the incentives to provide it, are increasing in the direct returns to eﬀort
(
p
c). Second, as high eﬀort becomes more highly correlated with good outcomes relative to
low eﬀort ((λ−µ)2 increasing), eﬀort becomes more desirable. When the value of eﬀort is
not suﬃciently large, the best the seller can do is never provide eﬀort and receive µp every
period. When the seller does desire to provide high eﬀort, her payoﬀs are lower than would
be the case under perfect monitoring. The ﬁnal term of her maximal value represents this
loss due to imperfect monitoring.
I now turn back to the game with private monitoring. As outcomes signal eﬀort level, it
is natural to let seller reputations depend on outcomes as well as any observable actions.
I use seller reputations based on those studied by Dellarocas (2004). A seller’s reputation
31is positive if her previous evaluation was positive, and negative if it was negative.27 Seller





0 if (rˆ s = 0 and eˆ b = 0) or (zˆ b=1 and eˆ b = 1)
1 if (rˆ s = 1 and eˆ b = 0) or (zˆ b=0 and eˆ b = 1).
(10)
I ﬁrst look at the case in which the community does not track buyer reputations. I assume
that an evaluation is provided altruistically with probability γ. Due to the fact that buyers
cannot develop reputations for information sharing, there is no incentive for strategic buyers
to provide evaluations. Therefore, sellers assume that the probability of an evaluation after
any transaction is γ. As the next proposition shows, maximal seller payoﬀs are a globally
stable equilibrium under local information processing for a wide range of parameters.





(λ−µ)2, then the maximal seller payoﬀ v = µp is obtainable as a globally stable
equilibrium under extended local information processing with a∗
ˆ s = {tˆ s=1,hˆ s=0,eˆ s=
0} and σs(r)=a∗




δ(λ−µ)2, then the maximal seller payoﬀ
vˆ s = pλ − c −
c(1−λ)
λ−µ
is obtainable as a globally stable equilibrium under extended local information process-
ing for γ ∈ [ c





{ts,hs,es} = {1,1,0} if rˆ s = 0
{ts,hs,es} = {1,1 − c
γp(λ−µ)2δ,0} if rˆ s = 1.
27In his base model, Dellarocas (2004) assumed that all buyers provide evaluations, and thus did not need
to specify a seller reputation when a seller is not evaluated.
32Proof. Let πrr0(aˆ b) be the probability that a seller with reputation r has reputation r0 next
period conditional on selecting action aˆ b. Under the assumption that a seller maintains the
same reputation if the buyer does not provide an evaluation, these transition probabilities
are given by:
π00(hˆ s=1) = 1−γ(1−λ)
π00(hˆ s=0) = 1−γ(1−µ)
π10(hˆ s=1) = γλ
π10(hˆ s=0) = γµ,
(11)
where the probability of transitioning to a negative reputation (rˆ s = 1) is one minus the
probability of transitioning to a positive one.
I look for an equilibrium strategy a∗
s such that a seller always selects high eﬀort when she has
a good reputation (rˆ s=0). The value of this strategy to a seller with a positive reputation
is:
vˆ s(rˆ s=0,a∗
s) = (1−δ)(pλ − c)+
+ δ (π00(hˆ s=1)·vˆ s(rˆ s=0,a∗
s) + (1−π00(hˆ s=1))·vˆ s(rˆ s=1,a∗
s))
(12)
Rearranging, in order for the seller to exert high eﬀort, it must be the case that:
vˆ s(rˆ s=0,a∗





Let ˜ h1 be the probability that a seller provides high eﬀort when she has a negative reputa-
tion. The value to her of a∗
s when she has a poor reputation is
vˆ s(rˆ s=1,a∗
s) = (1−δ)(p(˜ h1λ + (1−˜ h1)µ) − c)+
+ δ (π10(hˆ s=1)·vˆ s(rˆ s=0,a∗
s) + (1−π10(hˆ s=1))·vˆ s(rˆ s=1,a∗
s)).
(14)
Plugging equations (11), (12), and (13) into equation (14), I solve for the probability of
33high eﬀort conditional on the seller having a poor reputation










there exists a γ∗ ∈ (0,1] of high eﬀort given poor seller reputation (˜ h1) is non-negative.





(tˆ s=1,hˆ s=1,eˆ s=0) if rˆ s=0
(tˆ s=1,hˆ s=1− c
(µ−λ)2δγp,eˆ s=0) if rˆ s=1
vˆ s(rˆ s = 0,a∗
s) = λp −
c(1 − µ)
λ−µ
vˆ s(rˆ s = 1,a∗






For p ∈ [0,1], buyers receive non-negative payoﬀs from the trading game at p, and therefore
have no incentive to deviate. I now show that the seller is indiﬀerent between high and
low eﬀort, and therefore does not desire to deviate from the strategy proﬁle. If the seller is
indiﬀerent between eﬀort levels, then
− c + δ (πr0(hˆ s=1)·vˆ s(rˆ s=0,a∗
s)+(1−πr0(hˆ s=1))·vˆ s(rˆ s=1,a∗
s)) =
= δ (πr0(hˆ s=0)·vˆ s(rˆ s=0,a∗
s)+(1−πr0(hˆ s=0))·vˆ s(rˆ s=1,a∗
s)), (16)
where the left-hand side captures the payoﬀs from providing high eﬀort, the left from low,
and πr0(hˆ s) the probability of having a positive reputation next period (r=0) given eﬀort
34hˆ s and current reputation r. Equation (16) reduces to
vˆ s(rˆ s=0,a∗





As (πr0(hˆ s=1)−πr0(hˆ s=0)=(λ−µ) regardless of current reputation (rˆ s={0,1}), equation
(17) must hold as equation (13) holds.




(λ−µ)2, never providing eﬀort results in
σs(r) = (tˆ s=1,hˆ s=0) ∀ r
vˆ s(r,a∗
s) = µp.
For p ∈ [0,1], buyers receive non-negative payoﬀs from the trading game, and therefore
have no incentive to deviate. Likewise, the seller receives non-negative payoﬀs as well,
and therefore transacting dominates not transacting. As both current and continuation
payoﬀs are independent of whether the seller provides eﬀort, providing costly high eﬀort is
dominated by not providing costly high eﬀort.
As sellers play a∗ regardless of history, the equilibrium is globally stable. 
These results are similar to those presented by Dellarocas (2004) in his study of this seller
reputation mechanism in an auction setting.28 In the optimal high-eﬀort equilibrium, a seller
with a positive reputation always provides high eﬀort. This promise is credible because she
provides high eﬀort with a lower probability when she has a negative reputation. Buyers
pay less for a lower probability of high eﬀort, which means that a seller’s proﬁts are less
when she has a negative reputation.
28Dellarocas (2004) presents a more general seller reputation mechanism that presents, roughly, the number
of negative evaluations over preceding T periods. In the optimal seller strategy, the probability of high eﬀort
decreases linearly in the number of negative evaluations. For a given environment, there will be an maximum
T such that the equilibrium holds (T
max), and the maximal seller equilibrium value is independent of T for
all T less than T
max.
35Interestingly, assuming that the percentage of altruistic evaluators is suﬃcient to support the
high eﬀort equilibrium, the maximal seller equilibrium value does not depend on the actual
percentage of altruists. However, even if altruistically provided evaluations are suﬃcient to
support a high-eﬀort equilibrium, I now show that the eﬃciency achieved in the trading
game does depend on the frequency of evaluation provision.
Proposition 7. If the maximal eﬀort equilibrium is possible under extended local informa-
tion processing, then expected equilibrium eﬀort in the maximal eﬀort equilibrium is equal
to




and therefore is increasing in γ.
Proof of Proposition 7. The probability that a seller has a positive reputation in part deter-
mines the probability of high eﬀort on the equilibrium path. To calculate this probability,
note that the seller’s reputation progression is a Markov process as her reputation next
period depends only her current period state and actions. Letting ˜ h1 be the probability
that a seller exerts high eﬀort when she has a negative reputation, and recalling that sellers





1−γ(˜ h1λ + (1−˜ h1)µ) γ(1 − λ)















The long-run probability distribution over states, and therefore the expected probabilities
36of positive and negative sellers are:

Pr[rˆ s = 1]
















Expected seller eﬀort, ˜ h, is equal to Pr[rˆ s = 0]+(1− Pr[rˆ s = 0])˜ h1. After substituting for
reputation probabilities with equation (19) and for ˜ h1 with equation (15), this reduces to:












Even though the maximal seller equilibrium payoﬀs are available under local information
processing for any suﬃciently large discount rate, the overall expected eﬀort level, which
measures eﬃciency, is increasing in the probability of an evaluation. To see why, recall
that expected eﬀort is equal to Pr[rˆ s =0]+(1− Pr[rˆ s =0])˜ h1. Note that by equation (19),
evaluation probability has no direct eﬀect on the long-run distribution of seller reputations
(Pr[rˆ s = 0] and Pr[rˆ s = 1]). This distribution does, however, depend on the the expected
eﬀort level from sellers with a poor reputation, which, by Proposition 6, is increasing in
evaluation probability. Therefore, increasing the probability of evaluation increases both
the probability of a seller having a positive reputation (and thus providing high eﬀort with
certainty) and the probability of high eﬀort when the seller does ﬁnd herself with a poor
reputation.29
29Another way to see the link between the probability of evaluation and the value of a good reputation
is to note that the value of a good reputation is equal to a reward today plus the discounted value of a
convex combination of this good reputation value and the poor reputation value. Increasing the probability
37Therefore, even if altruistically provided evaluations are suﬃcient to support the high-eﬀort
equilibrium, it may be desirable to induce costly evaluation provision by strategic buyers. I
now look at a community that allows buyers to develop a reputation for sharing information.
I consider buyer reputations similar to those in the previous section: a buyer maintains a
positive reputation as long as he provided an evaluation in at least one of his previous Tb
transactions. Due to discounting, a strategic buyer will rate only in the ﬁnal period of his
cycle if he rates at all. Buyer reputations are given by:
φb(a,r,τ) =

       
       
0 if (rˆ b = 0 and (τ + xˆ b) mod Tb 6= 0)
or if ((τ + xˆ b) mod Tb=0 and eˆ b = 1)
1 if (rˆ b = 1 and (τ + xˆ b) mod Tb 6= 0)
or if ((τ + xˆ b) mod Tb=0 and eˆ b = 0).
(20)
The condition for the high eﬀort equilibrium presented in Proposition 6 can only be satisﬁed
with a positive probability of evaluation provision. In order for a high-eﬀort equilibrium to
be possible in the absence of altruists, sellers need to provide incentives to buyers to provide
evaluations.
Whether these incentives are always suﬃcient to induce buyers to provide evaluations (i.e.,
even oﬀ the equilibrium path) depends on whether a buyer believes that he will be able to
proﬁt regardless of his previous history. Recall the previous discussion concerning player
beliefs. In order for a given strategy proﬁle to be an equilibrium, it must be rational for
the buyer to provide evaluations even if he believes that all sellers currently have bad
reputations (i.e., he has pessimistic beliefs). With this belief, even if everyone plays the
equilibrium strategy from now on, the buyer believes that he is likely to encounter sellers
who need to be punished. This belief lowers the expected returns to a good reputation.
of evaluation decreases the value of this convex combination by increasing the probability of transitioning
to a bad reputation. Therefore, in order to maintain the same good reputation value, the value of a poor
reputation must increase. Increasing the probability of eﬀort conditional on a poor reputation increases the
value of this state.
38I ﬁrst solve for conditions which, starting from equilibrium beliefs, provide adequate in-
centives for buyers to provide evaluations. This will characterize conditions necessary for
the existence of a high eﬀort equilibrium in which incentives to provide evaluations to the
community arise endogenously. I then return to the need to provide these incentives in
face of pessimistic beliefs, and solve for suﬃcient conditions for high-eﬀort equilibria with
endogenous information sharing.
Maximal incentives for earning an information-sharing reputation are given when sellers
provide no eﬀort to buyers with a negative reputation. Let Ue be the expected payoﬀs
when a buyer provides an evaluation in the ﬁnal period of his reputation cycle, Un his
expected payoﬀs when he does not, and U∗ the payoﬀs resulting from the optimal strategy.
The returns to investing in a reputation for evaluation provision depend on the eﬀort that
a buyer expects from sellers given his positive reputation. Therefore, the distribution of
seller reputations will be important. Letting ˜ hr represent the probability of high eﬀort given




Pr[rˆ s|σs(r)]˜ hrˆ s.
Given that a buyer needs to evaluate once every Tb periods in order to maintain a positive
reputation, in the last period of a buyer’s reputation cycle, expected payoﬀs from providing
an evaluation and not are:
Ue = −k + δ
 













The buyer provides an evaluation if and only if Ue ≥ Un, or
k ≤ T(1 − p)(λ−µ)˜ hδT
b . (21)
39Expected seller eﬀort for a buyer with a positive reputation is determined endogenously.
As demonstrated in Proposition 6, seller eﬀort will be a function of both seller reputation
and the probability of evaluation. The next proposition details the necessary conditions for
the existence of a high-eﬀort equilibrium.
Proposition 8. If a globally stable equilibrium in which sellers provide high eﬀort exists,
then it must be the case that
k ≤
(1 − p)TbδTb  
cTb(1 − µ) − p(λ−µ)2δ

cTb − p(µ−λ)δ
for N ≥ Tb.
Proof. I assume that evaluations are provided once every Tb periods, and show that in the
maximal eﬀort equilibrium, buyers provide evaluations once every Tb periods. To determine
expected seller eﬀort, ˜ h, substitute γ = 1
Tb into equation (18). Substituting this expression
for ˜ h into equation (21) reduces to the inequality in the proposition. 
Proposition 8 highlights the two eﬀects of decreasing evaluation frequency (increasing Tb)
on the incentives for buyers to develop a positive reputation. The ﬁrst-order eﬀect is
positive. Decreasing the evaluation frequency necessary to maintain a positive reputation
increases the returns to a positive reputation as each evaluation buys more periods with
high expected eﬀort. This is partially mitigated by the second-order eﬀect identiﬁed in
Proposition 7: decreasing evaluation frequency lowers the eﬀort that buyers with a positive
reputation can expect from sellers.
Assuming the incentive compatibility condition in Proposition 8 is met, evaluation frequency
has two overall eﬃciency eﬀects. First, decreasing the frequency decreases the overall costs
of information provision. However, decreasing evaluation frequency lowers trading game
eﬃciency in games with imperfect monitoring. This contrasts with the case of perfect
40monitoring, in which evaluation frequency can be reduced to the incentive compatibility
threshold without eﬃciency cost in the trading game.
The preceding analysis identiﬁes conditions necessary for a high-eﬀort equilibrium, and
assumed “equilibrium” beliefs about seller eﬀort. I now return to the issue of suﬃcient in-
centives to provide evaluations when a buyer believes that currently all sellers have negative
reputations (i.e., pessimistic beliefs). I start by analyzing the case in which buyers must
provide an evaluation each period in order to maintain a positive reputation for information
sharing (i.e., Tb =1). The next proposition provides conditions suﬃcient to ensure that a












δ(λ−µ)2, then the maximal seller payoﬀ
vˆ s = pλ − c −
c(1−λ)
λ−µ
is obtainable as a globally stable equilibrium under extended local information processing.
Proof. Let the seller strategy be
σs(r) =

    
    
{ts,hs,es} = {1,1,0} if rˆ s=0 and rˆ b=0
{ts,hs,es} = {1,1 − c
p(λ−µ)2δ,0} if rˆ s=1 and rˆ b=0
{ts,hs,es} = {1,0,0} if rˆ b=1,
and the buyer strategy be σb = {tb,eb} = {1,1}. Letting Tb = 1 in equation (20), buyer





0 if eˆ b = 1
1 if eˆ b = 0.
41In the proposed equilibrium, buyers provide an evaluation each period. To see that the
seller strategy is an equilibrium strategy, note that buyer punishments last only one period.
Therefore, in equilibrium, all buyers have positive reputations next period. Therefore,
regardless of current beliefs, a seller believes that all future buyers will have a positive
reputation. Proof that seller strategies are equilibrium strategies follows from the Proof of
Proposition 6. Even if the current buyer has a negative reputation, U∗ remains unchanged
as all future buyers have positive reputations. Punishing the current buyer is a best response
as the seller is indiﬀerent between providing high and low eﬀort.
I now show that buyers choose to always provide an evaluation. I show that even if a
buyer believes his next partner will have a negative reputation, he still desires to provide
an evaluation. Letting ˆ h be equilibrium eﬀort level given rb=0 and rs=1, expected payoﬀs
from providing an evaluation and not are:
Ue = −k + δ

(1 − p)(λˆ h + (1 − ˆ hµ) + U∗

Un = δ ((µ(1 − p) + U∗).
Substituting 1− c
p(λ−µ)2δ for ˆ h and solving for k reduces to the condition in the Proposition.

The results of Proposition 9 provide suﬃcient conditions for the maximal eﬀort equilibrium
to be available under local information processing and imperfect personal monitoring when
information sharing is costly. Even if an agent believes that all potential trading partners
currently have a negative reputation, the speciﬁed strategies are an equilibrium. The condi-
tion in equation (22) states that even if a buyer is certain that his next partner will have a
negative reputation, the increase in surplus that he realizes as a result of the seller exerting
eﬀort with a positive probability is greater than the cost of an evaluation.
Even if equation (22) is not satisﬁed, the high-eﬀort equilibrium may still be feasible. First,
42consider an electronic commerce environment in which “the market” can credibly commit
to providing aggregate statistics on the distribution of seller reputations. In such a case,
pessimistic buyer beliefs may be untenable. Second, note that the derivation of equation (22)
assumed that a buyer needs to refresh his reputation each period. Decreasing the evaluation
frequency (increasing Tb) required to maintain a reputation for information sharing increases
the incentives for a buyer to develop a positive reputation. The analysis is complicated,30
but note that the longer buyer reputations last, the more likely a buyer will encounter
a seller with a positive reputation with his current reputation, even if he believes all his
future matches currently have a negative reputation. This increases the spread between the
surplus received when future sellers exert no eﬀort and the surplus received when more and
more sellers have positive reputation and exert high eﬀort with a high probability.
5 Discussion
The ability to earn and proﬁt from a good reputation can be an eﬀective mechanism for
eliciting costly eﬀort when an agent has myopic incentives to not incur the cost. This
fact has been long appreciated in the context of seller reputations for high eﬀort. My
main contribution in this paper is to show that reputations for gossiping can be eﬀective in
inducing the provision of information upon which a seller’s reputation is based. This ﬁnding
is particularly salient in electronic commerce environments, where the market designer can
control the information available to agents and level of information sharing suﬃcient to earn
the reputation for gossiping.
In January 2004, eBay changed the information that it provides about traders. It now
enables a member to view all of the feedback that a trader has left for her partners. eBay’s
30As we increase Tb, a seller with pessimistic beliefs can no longer be assured that her next partner will
have a positive reputation. Therefore, the speciﬁed strategies for providing high eﬀort are no longer best
responses on the path to equilibrium.
43information structure diﬀers from the mechanisms in this paper in two important ways.
First, by listing only the feedback left, and not listing those instances when a trader did
not provide feedback, a trader’s partner can only make inferences about the frequency with
which a trader has provided feedback.31 A buyer who has left feedback ten times in a
thousand opportunities is quite diﬀerent than the buyer who has left feedback ten times
in ten opportunities. Second, the content of each evaluation is listed. This opens the
possibility that a buyer may strategically adjust the content of his evaluations. Always
leaving positive feedback may signal an unwillingness to leave negative feedback, and tempt
a seller to provide poor service. Likewise, always leaving negative feedback may signal
unrealistic expectations about good quality, and thus the seller may provide low eﬀort at
she believes that she will not be rewarded for exerting high eﬀort. A buyer may try to ﬁnd
the optimal mix of positive and negative evaluations in order to elicit maximal seller eﬀort.
Ely et al. (2002) and Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki (2003) consider such games in which an agent has
an incentive to change his actions in order to strategically mold his reputation, and derive
conditions under which the reputation system can no longer ensure trustworthy behavior
as incentives to choose an action to make his history consistent with that of a trustworthy
person overwhelm the incentives to choose a trustworthy action in the current period. It
remains to be seen what eﬀects eBay’s information structure will have on incentives to
provide evaluations in a trustworthy manner.
In the mechanisms I propose, the incentives for buyers to obtain a reputation for informa-
tion sharing work just like those for seller reputations: there need to be suﬃcient returns
to building this reputation. I have identiﬁed three fundamental conditions that permit suf-
ﬁcient returns. First, sellers must be able to distinguish between buyers who do and do
not have reputations for information sharing. Second, sellers must be able to treat buyers
with a positive reputation diﬀerently from those with a negative reputation. Finally, buyers
31Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) show that traditionally, sellers leave feedback more frequently than
buyers. A seller can thus get get a rough idea of how frequently a buyer leaves feedback by comparing the
number of feedbacks the buyer has received with the number of feedbacks he has left.
44must retain a suﬃcient portion of the value created by this diﬀerential treatment. In the
perfect monitoring case, I assumed a ﬁxed transaction price. In order for buyers to desire
a positive reputation for information sharing, this price needs to be low enough to ensure
suﬃcient buyer surplus in the trading game for a buyer with a positive reputation. In the
imperfect monitoring case, I made the assumption that a buyer paid a ﬁxed fraction of
the expected value. The important implication of this assumption is that buyer surplus is
increasing in expected eﬀort, and therefore he has incentives to invest in a reputation that
promises extra eﬀort.
The results of this paper points out a diﬀerence between reputations for eﬀort and informa-
tion sharing. Sellers provide high eﬀort in order to avoid lower payoﬀs, and the community
desires high eﬀort as its cost is less than its value. While eﬀort is valuable in and of itself,
information is not in this context. Rather, its value lies in the seller eﬀort that it enables.
The question for a community or market designer is: “How much costly information do we
need to induce desired outcomes?”
In the case of perfect monitoring, the desired outcome of “high eﬀort always” is feasible with
suﬃcient information if players are patient enough. Reputations for information provision
can induce suﬃcient information. The level of information that is suﬃcient, and thus
the costs that must be borne to provide suﬃcient information, is decreasing as players
become more patient. This contrasts with the case of imperfect monitoring, in which “high
eﬀort always” is not feasible. Furthermore, there is a trade-oﬀ. More information increases
information costs, but enables a community to get closer to maximal eﬃciency in the trading
game.
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